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THE Π11↓ LO¨WENHEIM-SKOLEM-TARSKI PROPERTY OF
STATIONARY LOGIC
SEAN COX
Abstract. Fuchino-Maschio-Sakai [7] proved that the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem-
Tarski (LST) property of Stationary Logic is equivalent to the Diagonal
Reflection Principle on internally club sets (DRPIC) introduced in [4].
We prove that the restriction of the LST property to (downward) reflec-
tion of Π11 formulas, which we call the Π
1
1↓-LST property, is equivalent
to the internal version of DRP from [2]. Combined with results from [2],
this shows that the Π11↓-LST Property for Stationary Logic is strictly
weaker than the full LST Property for Stationary Logic, though if CH
holds they are equivalent.
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1. Introduction
Stationary Logic is a relatively well-behaved fragment of Second Order
Logic introduced by Shelah [12], and first investigated in detail by Barwise
et al [1]. Stationary Logic augments first order logic by introducing a new
second order quantifier stat ; we typically interpret “statZ φ(Z, . . . )” to mean
that there are stationarily many countable Z such that φ(Z, . . . ) holds.1 The
quantifier aa stands for “almost all” or “for club many”; so
aaZ φ(Z, . . . )
is an abbreviation for
¬ statZ ¬ φ(Z, . . . ).
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1Other interpretations, e.g. for uncountable Z, or for filters other than the club filter,
are often considered too.
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Section 2 provides more details.
By structure we will always mean a first order structure in a countable
signature. The question of whether every structure has a “small” elementary
substructure in Stationary Logic was raised already in [1]. One cannot hope
to always get countable elementary substructures; e.g. if κ is regular and
uncountable, then (κ,∈) satisfies “∈ is a linear order and
aaZ ∃x x is an upper bound of Z”,
but no countable linear order can satisfy that sentence. In a footnote in [1],
it was observed that even the statement
“Every structure has an elementary (w.r.t. Stationary Logic)
substructure of size ≤ ω1”
(LST)
carries large cardinal consistency strength.2 The quoted statement above is
now typically called the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem-Tarski (LST) property of Sta-
tionary Logic.3
Fuchino et al. recently proved that LST is equivalent to a version of the
Diagonal Reflection Principle introduced in Cox [4]:
Theorem 1.1 (Fuchino-Maschio-Sakai [7]). LST is equivalent to the Diag-
onal Reflection Principle on internally club sets (DRPIC).
The purpose of the present note is to prove the following variant of The-
orem 1.1 involving Π11 formulas in Stationary Logic (defined in Section 2
below) and the principle DRPinternal from [2]:
Theorem 1.2. The Π11↓-LST property of Stationary Logic (see Definition
2.2) is equivalent to the principle DRPinternal.
Cox [2] proved that DRPIC is strictly stronger than DRPinternal. This
was obtained by forcing over a model of a strong forcing axiom in a way
that preserved DRPinternal while killing DRPIC (in fact killing RPIC; the
argument owed much to Krueger [10]). Furthermore, if CH holds, then
DRPIC is equivalent to DRPinternal. Combining those results with Theorem
1.2 immediately yields:
Corollary 1.3. The LST property of Stationary Logic is strictly stronger
than the Π11↓-LST property of Stationary Logic.
However, if the Continuum Hypothesis holds, they are equivalent.4
2See Definition 2.2 for precisely what is meant by “elementary substructure” in this
context.
3The weaker assertion that every consistent theory (in Stationary Logic) has a model
of size ω1, on the other hand, is a theorem of ZFC, as proven in [1].
4One doesn’t actually need the full continuum hypothesis for this equivalence to hold,
but rather a variant of Shelah’s Approachability Property, namely that the class of inter-
nally stationary sets is the same (mod NS) as the class of internally club sets. See Cox [2]
for more details.
3Figure 1. An arrow indicates an implication, an arrow with
an X indicates a non-implication
MM++

// DRPIC oo //

Stationary Logic has
the LST property
(these 4 statements
are equivalent if CH holds)
Martin’s
Maximum
X© // DRPinternal oo //
X©
OO
Stationary Logic has
the Π11↓ LST property
We note that while the technical strengthening MM++ of Martin’s Maxi-
mum implies DRPIC (see [4]), recent work of Cox-Sakai [6] shows that Mar-
tin’s Maximum alone does not imply even the weakest version of DRP. Fig-
ure 1 summarizes the relevant implications and non-implications discussed
in this introduction.
Section 2 covers the relevant preliminaries, and Section 3 proves Theorem
1.2. Section 4 ends with some concluding remarks.
2. Preliminaries
Recall that S ⊆ [A]ω is stationary if it meets every closed, unbounded
subset of [A]ω (in the sense of Jech [9]). By Kueker [11] this is equivalent
to requiring that for every f : [A]<ω → A there is an element of S that is
closed under f .
In what follows, we will use uppercase letters to denote second order vari-
ables/parameters, and lowercase letters to denote first order variables/parameters.
We will also use some standard abbreviations; e.g. if our language includes
the ∈ symbol, v is a first order variable, and Z is a second order variable,
“v = Z” is short for
∀x x ∈ v ⇐⇒ Z(x).
Given a structure A = (A, . . . ) (which we always assume to have a count-
able signature), the satisfaction relation in Stationary Logic is defined re-
cursively by:
A |= statZ φ(Z,U1, . . . , Uℓ, p1, . . . , pk)
⇐⇒{
Z ∈ [A]ω : A |= φ(Z,U1, . . . , Uℓ, p1, . . . , pk)
}
is stationary in [A]ω.
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We define a hierarchy of formulas in Stationary Logic that mimics the
usual hierarchy in Second Order Logic. Since
aaZ φ(Z, . . . )
roughly translates as
∃C C is club and ∀Z ∈ C φ(Z, . . . ),
the aa quantifier will correspond to the existential second order quantifier
when constructing the hierarchy. Similarly, since
statZ φ(Z, . . . )
roughly translates as
∀C C is club =⇒ ∃Z ∈ C φ(Z, . . . ),
the stat quantifier will correspond to the universal second-order quantifier.
Definition 2.1. A formula in Stationary Logic without second order quan-
tifiers will be denoted by Σ1
0
or Π1
0
. For n > 0, a formula of the form
statZ1 . . . statZk φ(Z1, . . . , Zk, . . . )
where φ is Σ1n−1 will be called a Π
1
n
formula, and a formula of the form
aaZ1 . . . aaZk ψ(Z1, . . . , Zk, . . . )
where ψ is Π1n−1 will be called a Σ
1
n
formula.
For example, if φ(Z0, Z1, v1, . . . , vℓ) has no stat or aa quantifers, then
statZ0 aaZ1 φ(Z0, Z1, v1, . . . , vℓ)
is a Π12 formula.
Definition 2.2. We say that the LST property holds for Stationary
Logic iff for every structure A = (A, . . . )5 there exists a W ⊆ A of size ≤ ω1
such that for all formulas φ in Stationary Logic with no free occurrences of
second order variables, and all first order parameters p1, . . . , pk ∈W ,
A |= φ[~p] if and only if A|W |= φ[~p].
We say that the Π1
1
↓ LST property holds for Stationary Logic iff for
every structure A = (A, . . . ) there exists a W ⊆ A of size ≤ ω1 such that
for all Π11 formulas φ in Stationary Logic with no free occurrences of second
order variables, and all first order parameters p1, . . . , pk ∈W ,
if A |= φ[~p], then A|W |= φ[~p].
Remark 2.3. Note that in the definition of the Π11↓ LST property, we only
require that Π11 formulas reflect downward. If there is always an ω1 sized
substructure that reflects Π11 formulas both upward and downward, then the
full LST property holds. This issue is discussed further in Section 4.
5Recall we always assume countable signature, though for everything discussed in this
paper an ω1-sized signature would still be fine.
5We consider variants of the Diagonal Reflection Principle introduced
in Cox [4] and [2]. We use the following definition, which by Cox-Fuchs [5]
is equivalent to the definitions from [4] and [2]:
Definition 2.4. DRPinternal asserts that for every sufficiently large regular
θ, there are stationarily many W ∈ ℘ω2(Hθ) such that:
• |W | = ω1 ⊂W ; and
• Whenever A ∈ W is uncountable and S ∈ W is a stationary subset
of [A]ω, the set S ∩W ∩ [W ∩A]ω is stationary in [W ∩A]ω.
The “internal” part of the definition refers to the fact that we require that
S ∩W ∩ [W ∩A]ω is stationary, not merely that S ∩ [W ∩A]ω is stationary.
Definition 2.4 is simply the diagonal version of an internal variant of WRP
introduced in Fuchino-Usuba [8] (see Cox [2] for a discussion).
3. Proof of Theorem 1.2
We prove a slightly stronger variant of Theorem 1.2. The proof below is
strongly influenced by Fuchino et al [7].
Theorem 3.1. The following are equivalent:
(1) DRPinternal.
(2) For every structure A = (A, . . . ), there is aW ⊆ A of size at most ω1
such that for every finite list p1, . . . , pk ∈ W ∩A and every formula
φ without 2nd order quantifiers,
(
A |= statZ φ[Z, ~p]
)
=⇒
(
A|W |= statZ φ[Z, ~p]
)
.
(3) The Π11↓-LST property holds of Stationary Logic (as in Definition
2.2);
(4) For every structure A = (A, . . . ), there is aW ⊆ A of size at most ω1
such that for every formula ψ in 2nd order prenex form with no free
occurrences of second order variables, and every finite list p1, . . . , pk
of elements of W , if
A |= ψ[~p]
then, letting ψˆ be the formula obtained from ψ by changing all aa
quantifiers to stat quantifiers,
A|W |= ψˆ[~p].
Before proving the theorem, we remark that in parts 2, 3, and 4 of The-
orem 3.1, we only mentioned first order parameters from W ∩ A. If the
structure A is sufficiently rich then it often makes sense to also speak of
second-order parameters that are elements of W . But in general (e.g. when
A is a group) it is more natural to only speak of first order parameters from
W ∩A.
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Proof. (of Theorem 3.1): (4) trivially implies (3), since if ψ is represented
as a prenex Π11 formula, then ψˆ = ψ (because there are no aa quantifiers in
the original formula at all). Similarly, (3) trivially implies (2) because if φ
has no second order quantifiers,
statZ φ
is obviously a Π11 formula.
To see that (2) implies (1), assume (2) and suppose θ is a regular cardinal
≥ ω2. We need to find a W ≺ (Hθ,∈) such that |W | = ω1 ⊂ W and for
every s ∈W that is a stationary collection of countable sets,
s ∩W ∩
[
W ∩
⋃
s
]ω
is stationary.
Consider A = (Hθ,∈). Let W ⊂ Hθ be as in the statement of (2). Fix any
s ∈W that is a stationary collection of countable sets. Then
A |= statZ ∃p p = Z ∩
⋃
s and p ∈ s
and hence, since s ∈W and the only second order quantifier in the (prenex)
formula above is a stat quantifier,
A|W |= statZ ∃p p = Z ∩
⋃
s and p ∈ s.
Unravelling the definition of the satisfaction relation, this means that
{
Z ∈ [W ]ω : Z ∩
⋃
s ∈W ∩ s
}
is stationary in [W ]ω
and it follows that W ∩ s ∩
[
W ∩
⋃
s
]ω
is stationary in
[
W ∩
⋃
s
]ω
.
To see that ω1 ⊂W , it suffices to show that W ∩ω1 is uncountable (since
by first-order elementarity of W in (Hθ,∈), W ∩ ω1 is transitive). Now
A |= statZ ∃p ∃α
(
p = Z ∩ ω1, α < ω1, and α is an upper bound of p
)
,
so by assumption on W , this statement is also satisfied by A|W (note that
the parameter ω1 is an element of W because ω1 is first-order definable in A
andW is at least first-order elementary in A). IfW ∩ω1 were countable, say
W ∩ω1 = δ < ω1, it would follow that for stationarily many Z ∈W ∩ [W ]
ω,
there is an α < W ∩ ω1 = δ such that α is an upper bound of Z ∩ δ.
This would be a contradiction, since due to the countability of δ, the set of
Z ∈ [W ]ω such that δ ⊆ Z is a club.
Finally, to prove that (1) implies (4): fix a structure A = (A, . . . ) and
let θ be a sufficiently large regular cardinal with A ∈ Hθ. By (1) there
is a W ≺ (Hθ,∈,A) witnessing DRPinternal. We prove by induction on
complexity of formulas ψ in 2nd order prenex form that if p1, . . . , pk ∈W ∩A
and
A |= ψ[~p]
then, letting ψˆ be the result of replacing all aa quantifiers with stat quan-
tifiers,
A|(W ∩A) |= ψˆ[~p].
7We actually need to inductively prove a slightly stronger statement: namely,
that whenever ψ is a 2nd order prenex formula, p1, . . . , pk ∈ W ∩ A, and
Z1, . . . , Zℓ ∈W ∩ [A]
ω,
(1) A |= ψ[~Z, ~p] =⇒ A|(W ∩A) |= ψˆ[~Z, ~p].
So suppose
(2) A |= QZ φ[Z,U1, . . . , Uk, p1, . . . , pℓ]
where Q is either the aa or stat quantifier, U1, . . . , Uk are each elements of
W ∩ [A]ω, p1, . . . , pℓ ∈ W ∩ A, and the inductive hypothesis holds of the
formula φ.
Now regardless of whether Q is the aa or stat quantifier,
Q̂Z φ ≡ statZ φˆ.
and by (2) (since the aa quantifier is stronger than the stat quantifier)
A |= statZ φ[Z,U1, . . . , Uk, p1, . . . , pℓ].
Hence, by the definition of the stationary logic satisfaction relation,
s :=
{
Z ∈ [A]ω : A |= φ[Z, ~U, ~p ]
}
is stationary in [A]ω .
Note that since ~U , ~p, φ, and A are elements of W , it follows that s ∈ W .
Since W is internally diagonally reflecting,
s ∩W ∩ [W ∩A]ω is stationary in [W ∩A]ω.
Consider for the moment an arbitrary Z ∈ s ∩W ∩ [W ∩A]ω. Then
A |= φ[Z, ~U, ~p]
and it follows by the induction hypothesis (and that Z, ~U , and ~p are each
elements of W ) that:
A|(W ∩A) |= φˆ[Z, ~U, ~p].
Hence, we have shown that
s ∩W ∩ [W ∩A]ω ⊆
{
Z ∈ [W ∩A]ω : A|(W ∩A) |= φˆ[Z, ~U, ~p]
}
.
Since the set on the left side is stationary, the set on the right side is too.
So by the definition of the satisfaction relation,
A|(W ∩A) |= statZ φˆ[Z, ~U, ~p ].
This completes the proof of the (1) =⇒ (4) direction.
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4. Concluding remarks
We remark that it is straightforward to show, in ZFC alone, that:
Lemma 4.1. For every structure A = (A, . . . ) there exists a W ⊆ A of size
at most ω1 such that
A|W ≺
Σ1
1
↓
A
(i.e. such that Σ11 formulas satisfied by A are also satisfied by A|W ).
In fact, if θ is a regular cardinal such that A ∈ Hθ, and
W ≺1st order (Hθ,∈,A)
is such that |W | = ω1 and
(3) W ∩ [W ∩A]ω contains a club in [W ∩A]ω
(this always holds for stationarily many W , e.g. for those W that are inter-
nally approachable), then
A|(W ∩A) ≺
Σ1
1
↓ A.
We briefly sketch the proof of the lemma; more details, and other related
results, can be found in Cox [3]. One proves by induction on complexity
of formulas, making use of (3), that if φ is Σ11, p1, . . . , pk ∈ W ∩ A, and
Z1, . . . , Zℓ ∈W ∩ [A]
ω, then
if A |= φ[~Z, ~p] , then A|(W ∩A) |= φ[~Z, ~p].
This was basically part of the proof from Fuchino et al [7] that DRPIC
implied the LST for Stationary Logic. See [3] for some other related ZFC
theorems.
So by Lemma 4.1 one can always get an ω1 sized substructure that reflects
all Σ11 statements downward. And if DRPinternal holds, one can also get an
ω1 sized substructure that reflects all Π
1
1 statements downward. But it is
consistent that both of these are true, yet no single ω1-sized substructure
downward reflects all Π11 and all Σ
1
1 statements. In particular, in any model
where DRPinternal holds and DRPIC fails, Theorem 1.2 tells us that there
is a structure such that no ω1-sized substructure reflects all Π
1
1 and all Σ
1
1
statements (though there are structures that reflect one or the other).
Another way to view this phenomenon, in terms of DRP-like principles,
is that DRPinternal yields stationarily many W ∈ ℘ω2(Hθ) such that the
transitive collapse HW ofW is “correct about stationary sets”; i.e. whenever
s ∈ HW and HW |= “s is a stationary set of countable sets”, then V believes
this too. However, ifW is not internally club, it is possible (by [2]) that HW
is correct about stationary sets, but is not correct about clubs; i.e. there can
be a c ∈ HW such that HW |= “c is a club of countable sets”, but V does
not believe this. If, on the other hand, W witnesses DRPIC, then HW is
correct about both stationarity and clubness.
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